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A dynamic model of group performance is suggested that combines the group learning approach and the combination of contributions approach. Three hypotheses are tested in two experiments, comparing individual training conditions with mixed group and individual training conditions on subsequent nominal and collective group performance of rule induction tasks under identical time constraints. As predicted, collective group performance improves as a function of group experience, nominal group performance improves as a function of improved individual resources for performing the task individually, and group experience reduces process losses by improving individuals' ability to collaborate efficiently. Several experiments from the literature that address issues of group learning are analyzed in the light of the propositions made in the dynamic model. Overall, theoretical and experimental approaches to investigating group learning phenomena are discussed.
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We present a dynamic model of group performance that integrates theoretical work and experimental research on group learning phenomena. The model is guided by the assumption that actual group performance is a function of group potential performance minus process loss plus process gain (e.g. Forsyth, 1999) . Furthermore, it combines two theoretical approaches to the study of small group performance, the combination of contributions approach and the group learning approach. The essential assumption of the combination of contributions approach is that group interaction can be modeled as a mapping process from a dispersed array of group members' resources (e.g. correct or incorrect responses to a logic problem) to a single group response (for a recent review, see Hinsz, Tindale, & Vollrath, 1997) . The fundamental assumption of the group learning approach is that group performance improves with the repetitive performance of different but similar tasks (e.g. Argote, 1993; Argote & McGrath, 1993) .
Individual versus group performance
Process loss and process gain
The debate about the superiority of group versus individual performance has resulted in two basic perspectives. On the one hand, group deficit theories take the position that group performance implies process loss due to reduced motivation and suboptimal coordination (e.g. Steiner, 1972) . Motivation loss describes the reduced individual willingness to exert maximum effort when performing the task in a group setting as illustrated, for example, in free riding, social loafing or sucker effects (for reviews see Kerr, 1983; Shepperd, 1993) . Coordination loss describes situational constraints resulting from social interaction processes that prevent individual group members from performing at the level of their individual potential, for example, production blocking (Diehl & Stroebe, 1987) or non-simultaneous individual activity (Kravitz & Martin, 1986) . On the other hand, group bonus theories posit that group process can result in 'assembly effects' (Collins & Guetzkow, 1964) or process gains when emergent efforts, ideas, knowledge or solutions are generated through group interaction resulting in a performance 'bonus' that surpasses the level of potential productivity, for example, via correcting each others' errors (problem 2, Shaw, 1932 ; see the review by Brown, 1988; Lorge & Solomon, 1955) , via competition when the group members' individual levels of performance are perceived to be comparable (Köhler, 1927; Stroebe, Diehl, & Abakoumkin, 1996; Witte, 1989) , or via social compensation, when it is obvious that a partner is unintentionally less able to perform as well as oneself and when the task is of high importance to the whole group (Experiment 3, Williams & Karau, 1991) .
According to the experimental literature comparing individual versus group performance, groups are often superior to individuals in different types of unitary tasks (e.g. problem solving, decision making, idea generation). When taking into account that group resources are larger than individual resources according to combination of contributions models, most of the experimental evidence, however, supports the view of process loss and the evidence for net process gain is fragmentary at best (for reviews see, for example, Brown, 1988; Gigone & Hastie, 1997; Hare, Blumberg, Davies, & Kent, 1994; Hastie, 1986; Hill, 1982; Hinsz et al., 1997; Lamm & Trommsdorf, 1973; Laughlin, 1980; Lorge, Fox, Davitz, & Brenner, 1958; Stasser, Kerr, & Davis, 1989; Steiner, 1972; Stroebe et al., 1996) . However, we cannot conclude that process gain is non-existent. Although evidence of process gain has often been questioned, and often for good reasons (see for instance the debate between Michaelsen, Watson, & Black, 1989; Michaelsen, Watson, Schwartzkopf, & Black, 1992; Tindale & Larson, 1992a , 1992b , we should be aware that it has not been disproved. Some empirical evidence for process gain has been presented, as was described above, and from a theoretical point of view, process loss and process gain can coexist when assuming independence between the underlying causes (cf. Forsyth, 1999; Hackman & Morris, 1975; Shaw & Ashton, 1976) .
Under these circumstances, one research strategy for identifying factors that facilitate process gain is to eliminate known causes of process loss. This has been done occasionally, such as when computer-mediated communication was used in order to reduce coordination loss resulting from social interaction (e.g. Valacich, Dennis, & Conolly, 1994) , or when conditions of motivation loss are eliminated (cf. Shepperd, 1993) , for example, by strengthening group identity prior to group task performance (Holt, cited in Brown, 1988, p. 141) . A third approach to reducing process loss and eventually identifying factors that facilitate process gain is the consideration of 'group members' capacity to learn' (Hill, 1982, p. 535 ). Our dynamic model embodies this third approach.
Combination of contributions models
In the literature, various combinatorial models can be found that represent how group members' resources ought to be combined in order to employ the group's fund of individual resources (i.e. nominal group potential) or how group members' resources are actually combined during group interaction (i.e. social combination models); for reviews and discussions of particular models, see Baron, Kerr, and Miller (1992) , Davis (1969) , Einhorn, Hogarth, and Klempner (1977) , Gigone and Hastie (1997) , Hastie (1986) , Hill (1982) , Hinsz et al. (1997) , Laughlin, VanderStoep, and Hollingshead (1991) , Lorge and Solomon (1955) , Stasson and Bradshaw (1995) , Steiner (1972) and Tindale and Larson (1992a) . Most of the combinatorial models do not explicitly incorporate the 'group members' capacity to learn' aspect. They operate under the implicit assumption of 'static' individual resources (cf. Hill, 1982) . Some models are concerned with multistep tasks (Kerr, 1982; Model B, Lorge & Solomon, 1955) ; however, they do not consider changes in individual resources across several tasks. Our intention was to develop a dynamic model that incorporates group member learning across several tasks when modeling group potential and collective performance along the lines suggested by Shiflett (1979) and Brehmer (1976) .
Considering change in group resources
The group members' capacity to learn during task performance has been widely ignored in the mainstream experimental research about group versus individual performance (cf. Brown, 1988; Hill, 1982; Hinsz et al., 1997; Shiflett, 1979) . Traditionally, short lived ad hoc groups performing no more than one or two tasks were used, although it is known that in laboratory settings facilitative effects on group performance as a result of group interaction do not necessarily materialize immediately or after one or two task trials (e.g. McGlynn & Schick, 1973) . Often additional investments are necessary before group performance becomes effective, for example, the extra time and effort invested in a common fate or high cohesiveness (e.g. Holt, cited in Brown, 1988; McGlynn & Schick, 1973) , in group developmental processes (e.g. storming and norming, cf. Tuckman & Lorge, 1962) or in task specific group training (cf. Reagan-Cirincione, 1994) . With the assumption in mind that profitable learning processes are costly during early phases of group performance, the use of ad hoc groups that solve only one or two tasks and the use of 'static' combinatorial models results in an overestimation of process loss and an underestimation of process gain.
Group learning approach
In a similar vein, McGrath (1990 McGrath ( , 1991 and Argote and McGrath (1993) argue that the idea of process losses (assessed by comparison of actual group performance with prediction of combinatorial models) makes questionable assumptions about groups in action such as: 'The acting group is not (or at least should not) be doing something else except the specific task the experimenter has in mind' (Argote & McGrath, 1993, p. 357) . This assumption designates other behavior during group performance related to, for example, cooperative task requirements, synchronization of individual and collective activities, conflict resolution or group maintenance functions, as 'error' or process loss. However, these behaviors can also be regarded as evidence that groups are engaged in a more complex activity than is anticipated by the researcher's combinatorial models. As groups gain experience in executing their tasks, they acquire knowledge via processes of reconstruction, that is, the embedding of knowledge in people, technology and the groups' purposes, plans and procedures (Argote & McGrath, 1993) . Such preservation, on the one hand, typically leads to improved group performance over time or across a series of several tasks, and, on the other hand, it requires investments in terms of extra effort, practice, experiential learning or cognitive elaboration, especially during early task trials. Thus, for a fair experimental comparison of nominal and actual group performance (i.e. a fair test of process loss and process gain), extra task activities should be considered as potential investments that result in group performance benefits on later occasions. In order to allow for the manifestation of a 'return on investments' in subsequent group performance, experimental designs with more than only one or two consecutive group tasks are necessary.
Group level learning
Some further theoretical concepts about group learning have been developed, mainly from a social cognitive and systems perspective (e.g. Argote, 1993; Hinsz et al., 1997; Kerr, MacCoun, & Kramer, 1996; Larson & Christensen, 1993; Nye & Brower, 1996; Tschan & von Cranach, 1996) . These uniformly maintain the assumption that group performance improves as a function of experience, for example, via 'group learning' (Argote, 1993; Argote & Epple, 1990) , 'group level integrative complexity' (Gruenfeld & Hollingshead, 1993) , 'transactive memory systems' (Liang, Moreland, & Argote, 1995; Wegner, 1986) , 'group culture and socialization' (Moreland, Argote, & Krishnan, 1996) or 'social processing of information' (Davis & Harless, 1996) . Some of these authors postulate 'group level learning', a dynamic property of the working group as a whole that cannot be explained by individual level learning improvements (e.g. Argote, 1993; Davis & Harless, 1996; Gruenfeld & Hollingshead, 1993; Liang et al., 1995) . However, such a phenomenon is difficult to identify experimentally because it requires demonstrating that changes in group performance actually result from group level learning phenomena (e.g. structural changes of collective resources as a whole such as transactive memory systems; cf. Liang et al., 1995; Wegner, 1986) and not from individual level learning that extends to actual group performance, for example, via the nominal group potential.
Group-to-individual transfer
When considering individual level learning that extends to the nominal group potential, purely individual task learning and practice need to be differentiated from learning and practice effects that result from prior collective group performance (e.g. via vicarious learning or exchange of basic principles to effective task performance). The possibility that individual resources for performing a task effectively improve as a function of social interaction between group members during collective task performance has been described in the literature as 'group-to-individual transfer' (G-I transfer, e.g. Hudgins, 1960; Laughlin & Sweeney, 1977) . G-I transfer has been predominantly investigated in educational and developmental psychology (for reviews see, for example, Azmitia, 1996; Dillenbourg, Baker, Blaye, & O'Malley, 1996; Slavin, 1992) . In situations of cooperative learning, G-I transfer has been shown to result from interpersonal cognitive conflict (Doise & Mugny, 1979) , cognitive conflict resolution (Nastasi & Clements, 1992) and interpersonal correction of contradictions and errors (Azmitia & Montgomery, 1993) .
In small group research, most of the attempts to identify G-I transfer were based on just one previous work session before a final evaluation, and they have failed (cf. Laughlin & Barth, 1981; Laughlin & Sweeney, 1977) . Very rarely was positive G-I transfer shown. For the same tasks performed repeatedly, Laughlin and Ellis (1986) and Laughlin and Adamopoulos (1980) report evidence that more correct solutions are reached after group task performance than after individual task performance. For different tasks of the same type, positive G-I transfer was demonstrated only once by Stasson, Kameda, Parks, Zimmermann, and Davis (1991) using mathematical problem solving tasks. The authors formulated the post hoc assumption that when the effectiveness of task performance strategies is evident in the group collaborative context, these strategies are adopted by other group members and profitably transferred to new problems. Brodbeck and Greitemeyer (in press) confirmed this assumption by using series of rule induction tasks (cf. Laughlin et al., 1991; Laughlin & Hollingshead, 1995) that were solved by individuals and groups under identical conditions of moderate time pressure. G-I transfer was shown for simple task performance strategies that are effective and highly evident in the group collaborative context (i.e. the correction of demonstrably false hypotheses), while no positive G-I transfer was found for complex task performance strategies that are effective but much less evident in the group collaborative context under moderate time pressure (e.g. the multistep hypothesis testing strategy of focusing, cf. Laughlin, 1968 Laughlin, , 1973 .
Based on these results, it appears to be theoretically possible that individual experiences made during collaborative task performance raise subsequent levels of collective group performance via the nominal group potential. Therefore, in our dynamic model, G-I transfer is considered as a mechanism by which group learning occurs over and above the individual task learning.
Group potential and collective performance
Both types of individual level learning improvements (individual learning and G-I transfer) do not guarantee a rise of subsequent levels of group potential and actual performance. On the one hand, the nominal group potential may not be affected by individual level learning improvements because the redundancy of individual resources per group changes but not the distributional pattern of individual resources that is relevant to performing the task effectively (Shiflett, 1979) . For example, consider a best member combinatorial model for eurekatype group problems. At the pretest, only one person in a group solves the problem individually (so the nominal group solves the problem). At the posttest, all other group members have learned to solve the problem individually. In this case, the average individual performance per group improves, but on the group level the nominal potential remains the same. On the other hand, collective group performance may not be affected by individual level learning benefits, even though the nominal group potential improves. The newly learned strategies to effectively perform a given task individually may not be applied (or applicable) in the group collaborative context. Brodbeck and Greitemeyer (in press) showed that the individual ability to correct one's own errors that improves as a result of group collaborative performance (G-I transfer) is not directly transferred to subsequent group collaborative performance. Subjects with prior group experience did not show better individual error correction behavior during collective task performance in the posttest than group members in the control condition. Instead, subjects with group experience showed higher levels of correcting each others' errors than subjects in the individual control condition, thereby improving collective group performance. Group members seem to have learned two different things from working collaboratively: First, to better correct their own errors in individual task contexts (but not in the group context), and second, to better correct each others' errors in the group context.
From these findings we infer that a dynamic model of group performance should account for individual learning and G-I transfer effects that may (or may not) result in higher levels of group performance via the nominal group potential, depending on how the distribution of individual resources per group changes. Furthermore, it needs to account for individual learning to collaborate that directly affects collective group performance.
Propositions of the dynamic model
Our dynamic model builds upon the fundamental assumption of the group learning approach.
Proposition 1
Group performance improves as a function of experience.
The dynamic model integrates the group learning and the combination of contributions approach by conceptualizing group learning as an aggregate of changing individual resources (e.g. ability, knowledge, skill and motivation to effectively perform a task, cf. Hackman, 1987) . More specifically, the model addresses the differential etiology of changes in individual resources and how these contribute to nominal group potential and collective performance.
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Proposition 2
Group learning is an aggregate function of three sources of change in individual resources:
1. Improvement of individual resources for performing a given task individually as a result of prior individual task performance (individual learning). 2. Improvement of individual resources for performing a given task individually as a result of prior group task performance (G-I transfer). 3. Improvement of individual resources for performing a given task in a collaborative group as a result of prior group task performance (learning to collaborate).
Individual resources change as a function of individual learning and adaptation to requirements of the individual task performance context (e.g. by practice, experiential learning, strategy development, knowledge acquisition). Individual learning is accounted for in the dynamic model because changes in group performance may simply reflect changes in individual resources that are independent from social interaction in group collaborative contexts. Furthermore, individual resources might change as a function of social interaction in group collaborative contexts by exchange of strategies or basic principles of solving the task or by learning to better monitor one's own activities through monitoring the activities of other group members (G-I transfer). Finally, during group performance, individuals are confronted with extra-task requirements that are only evident in a collaborative context (e.g. coordinating individual contributions, solving conflict, monitoring the performance of other group members). Such collaboration experiences enable group members to better contribute their own task relevant resources to the actual performance during collaborative activity or to help others to better convert their resources into correct overt responses.
The suggested model accounts for the changing nature of individual resources and their distribution among a group in two different ways: (a) by specifying changes in the nominal group potential (i.e. combinatorial modeling of optimal group performance based on individual task performance) and (b) by specifying changes in the collective group potential (i.e. the combinatorial modeling of actual group performance based on individual task performance during group task performance). The collective potential of a group, when compared to the respective nominal potential, reflects the extent to which individual resources to perform a task individually are mobilized in the collaborative group setting (i.e. the extent of process loss).
It was said that individual learning to collaborate can determine subsequent group performance via the collective group potential. Thus, process loss due to the group members' inability to mobilize individual resources relevant to the task should decrease as a function of prior group task performance.
Proposition 3
The difference between the nominal and the collective group potential decreases as a function of prior group task performance (i.e. reduction in process loss).
The present study tests these three propositions by conducting an extended analysis on data obtained from a study described by Brodbeck and Greitemeyer (in press) and by performing a new experiment, with both experiments using the individual versus collective rule induction paradigm.
Rule induction
Rule induction is the search for descriptive, predictive and explanatory generalizations, rules and principles (cf. Laughlin & Hollingshead, 1995) . Individuals (or members of a group) observe patterns and regularities in a particular domain and propose hypotheses to account for them. They then evaluate the hypotheses by observation and experiment, and revise them accordingly. Research teams, medical diagnostic teams or audit teams conducting analytical reviews are examples for collective rule induction in various applied domains (Laughlin et al., 1991) . For rule induction tasks, for example, as described by Laughlin et al. there is an unlimited set of plausible hypotheses to start with. It
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needs to be reduced via systematic testing of evidence during multiple task steps. As the constraints imposed by the accumulation of evidence reduce the number of possible hypotheses, the correct hypothesis (arbitrarily selected by the researcher) acquires distinctiveness because of its relative simplicity or elegance compared to other hypotheses that are also consistent with the evidence (McGlynn, Tubbs, & Holzhausen, 1995 ). Laughlin's rule induction paradigm allows measurement of the contributions made by individual group members during individual and collective rule induction. This enables determining the nominal group potential as well as the collective group potential as defined in the dynamic model.
Cooperative groups perform this type of rule induction better than individuals (e.g. Laughlin & Futoran, 1985) and they perform at a level that approaches the truth-wins social combination model (i.e. the level of potential productivity for disjunctive tasks, cf. Steiner, 1972) . Furthermore, rule induction offers learning opportunities. It requires learning of general strategies to generate, evaluate and test hypotheses. Individual performance of rule induction was described as improving with task experience (Laughlin & Hollingshead, 1995; McGlynn et al., 1995) . In a recent experiment reported by Hollingshead (1998) , a linear trend of performance improvement across three consecutive individual tasks trials was demonstrated, thus giving a clear example of individual learning in rule induction. Furthermore, in that study it was shown that the more members practice as a group, the better they perform as a group. This finding suggests that the general assumption of the group learning approach applies to collective induction. A test for enhancing effects of prior group performance did not reveal any evidence for G-I transfer. Hollingshead (1998) interprets her results of group learning in terms consistent with the notion of the development of transactive memory systems (Liang et al., 1995; Moreland et al., 1996; Wegner, 1986 ), which is a group level learning construct.
In our study we were interested in extending current research by differentiating and separating out the effects of group learning into individual task learning, G-I transfer and individual learning to collaborate.
Considering time and efficiency
It is well known that groups generally take more time for the same task than individuals due to extra-task requirements (e.g. coordination, decision making, conflict resolution). On the one hand, such extra activities might prevent individual group members from mobilizing their individual potential for performing the collective task effectively (i.e. process loss), at least during the first few task trials. On the other hand, a prolonged collective occupation with group tasks might enhance individual performance because group members (especially those less involved in decision making, conflict resolution or coordination activities) might occupy themselves with the task also for a longer period of time. The experiments which compared individual and collective induction we know from the literature (Hollingshead, 1998; Laughlin & Futoran, 1985; Laughlin & Hollingshead, 1995; Laughlin & Shippy, 1983; Laughlin et al., 1991; McGlynn et al., 1995) do not report on the duration of individual versus group task performance. Usually a safe margin of about 50 minutes maximum was given to perform a 10-or 15-step rule induction task, both for individuals and for groups. By using the same 10-step rule induction tasks as described in Laughlin et al. (1991) and Hollingshead (1998) , Brodbeck (1998) found that without prior task experience, three-person groups take about three times longer for task completion (23 minutes) than individuals (8 minutes). This means that the often reported ad hoc group benefit in rule induction might well be a result of the group members' prolonged occupation with the task. In order to control experimentally for the group prolongation effect, the same time limit of 10 minutes was used in our studies in both individual and group task settings.
Efficient truth detection
A challenging time limit for groups offers the opportunity to study aspects of collective Brodbeck & Greitemeyer a dynamic model of group performance efficiency in rule induction which has not been studied before. When rule induction is performed under moderate time pressure of 10 minutes, the efficient use of the maximum number of hypothesis testing steps is a critical task requirement. In our research we were interested in this type of efficient truth detection in rule induction. For optimal individual performance, at least an awareness of the particular time restriction and appropriate action is helpful, as is the knowledge that using all possible hypothesis testing steps within the time limit yields a maximum of feedback information. For optimal collective performance, extra-task requirements also need to be fulfilled, including smooth coordination, fluent group decision making and rapid conflict resolution. For previously unknown tasks, such as the rule induction paradigm from Laughlin et al. (1991) is to university student participants, a time limit of 10 minutes imposed on individuals and groups means a higher challenge to groups because their members need to adapt to the extra-task requirements over and above the individual task requirements for efficient performance.
Summary of hypotheses
Hypothesis 1
Group performance of truth detection in rule induction under moderate time pressure increases as a function of experience.
Hypothesis 2
The nominal group potential for truth detection increases with group task experience as a result of individual task performance learning.
Hypothesis 3a
Group experience reduces process loss (i.e. the difference between nominal and collective group potential).
Hypothesis 3b
The reduction in process loss (due to group experience) is mediated via individual learning to collaborate more smoothly (i.e. collective efficiency).
No particular assumptions were made about process gain. However, according to our dynamic model, the possibility that it can occur needs to be accounted for by the experimental design. Process gain is inferred when G-I transfer extends to the nominal group potential and when individual learning to collaborate extends to the collective group potential so that it surpasses the nominal group potential.
Experiment 1
In the first experiment an extended analysis of a study reported by Brodbeck and Greitemeyer (in press) was conducted. The original study focused on changes in individual task performance behavior (error correction and hypothesis testing strategies) during the pretest (task trial 1) and the posttest (task trials 9 and 10) while comparing individual training conditions with mixed group and individual training conditions. For our purpose here, data on the individuals' and groups' final solutions per task trial (truth detection) are used and analyzed across all task trials for determining progress curves of group and individual learning.
Method
Participants and design Participants were 132 students from German universities and technical colleges in Munich who received 30 German marks (about US$16) for their participation. The experimental design was a two factorial (individual training vs. mixed individual and group training) two level posttest (individual vs. group performance) design with 22 three person groups in each experimental condition.
Procedure and instructions Participants were randomly assigned to sets of three people and to each experimental condition. The experimenters made sure that well-acquainted individuals were not tested in the same group. At the very beginning, all participants were informed that in this experiment they could improve their capability for problem solving and team work. A practice trial was conducted in order to acquaint them with the general requirements for performing the experimental task accurately. Then, random series of eight
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rule induction tasks were performed by sets of three participants assigned to either the individual training condition where they performed all tasks by themselves in the presence of the same two other members (i.e. nominal group setting), or to the mixed individual and group training condition where every second task was performed collectively in a collaborative group setting. Subsequently, individual performance was measured in a nominal group setting and group performance was measured in a collaborative group setting. Subjects were also asked to answer several items on a questionnaire before and after the practice trial as well as before and after the collective posttest. After completion, the experimenter thanked the subjects and paid them for their participation, explained the purpose of the experiment, answered any questions and asked them not to discuss the experiment with any potential future participants. The entire experiment lasted for about 4 hours. The experimental design is described in Table 1 in the results section. Three stages can be distinguished: (a) the pretest measuring individual performance in a nominal group setting (task trial 1), (b) the training phase with a total of seven task trials in which the experimental conditions were introduced and (c) the posttest measuring individual performance in a nominal group setting (task trial 9) and group performance in a collaborative setting (task trial 10). A mixed individual and group training treatment was used (instead of group training only) because the decrease of process loss as a function of group task experience was to be tested. According to our dynamic model, process loss is represented as the difference between neighboring nominal and collective group potentials. Thus, both types of group potentials had to be assessed within the treatment condition. As can be seen in Table 1 , altogether five differences between neighboring nominal and collective group potentials can be calculated. This method allows modeling a progress curve of process loss within the treatment condition.
Rule induction paradigm The particular rule induction task as described in Laughlin et al. (1991) , Laughlin and Hollingshead (1995) and Hollingshead (1998) was used. A rule had to be induced that partitioned a deck of 52 playing cards with four suits (clubs ϭ C, diamonds ϭ D, hearts ϭ H, spades ϭ S) of 13 cards (ace ϭ 1, two ϭ 2, . . ., jacks ϭ 11, queens ϭ 12, kings ϭ 13) into examples and non-examples of the rule. The instructions indicated that the rule could be based on suit, number (e.g. odd ϭ o, even ϭ e), color (red ϭ r, black ϭ b) or any combination of numerical and logical operations on these attributes (e.g. combination of colors and odd vs. even numbers). The rule sequence length consisted of either three or four cards. Each task began with a card that was known to be an example of the rule. There were 10 different rules: r-r-b-b, r-r-b, be-ro-be, bo-rebe, ro-so-re, S-D-S-D, e-o-e, C-C-S, e-e-o-e, S-S-H-C. The most difficult rule was S-S-H-C; only 32 percent of all subjects solved that rule correctly. The easiest rule was r-r-b-b; altogether 71 percent of all subjects solved that rule correctly. After each task trial the experimenter told the participants whether the final rule was correct or not (no indication about plausible hypotheses was given). All 10 rules were permuted randomly across the 10 task trials in a way that two three-person groups, one for each experimental condition, shared the same random sequence of task trials (sibling groups). Thus, task difficulty was randomly distributed across task trial positions and balanced between experimental conditions. Procedure for an individual rule induction task Sets of three participants performed the same task by themselves in the presence of two other group members. Communication was not allowed. While observation of the other group members was possible, their activities concerning the rule induction task could not be perceived. In the first step, each individual, confronted with one card on the table that was an example of the rule, noted his/her hypothesis on a sheet. In the second step, any of the 52 cards could be chosen and placed to the right of the last example card of the rule. The card played was also documented. The experimenter informed the player whether the selected card was an example or non-example of the rule by Brodbeck & Greitemeyer a dynamic model of group performance non-verbal feedback; examples of the rule were placed to the right of the last example, nonexamples were placed below the last card played. No further feedback was given during task performance. A maximum of 10 steps per task trial was allowed (each step comprised individual hypothesis formation, card selection and feedback). Finally, each player informed the experimenter about the final hypothesis and was given feedback whether the final solution was correct or not.
Procedure for a collective induction task
Sets of three participants performed the same task collaboratively. In the first step, each individual wrote down his/her hypothesis on a private sheet. In the second step, group members had to reach a group decision about a collective hypothesis that was recorded on a group sheet. In the third step, the groups decided on which of the 52 cards to play in order to test their group hypothesis. The group card played was also recorded on the group sheet. Next, the experimenter informed the group whether the selected card was an example or non-example of the rule by placing it on the respective position (see above). A maximum of 10 steps (individual and group hypothesis formation, group card selection and group feedback) per task trial was allowed. Finally, the experimenter was informed about the final group hypothesis and gave feedback about its correctness. For more details see the description of Laughlin and Hollingshead (1995, p. 97) .
Time restriction In order to control for the group prolongation effect and to study how group experience influences collective efficiency, individuals and groups worked under the same time limit per task trial. All participants were instructed that time was irrelevant to performance evaluation (solution quality), but that time limits would be strictly enforced and that task performance would benefit from adherence to all 10 steps. A time limit of 10 minutes was chosen because it particularly challenges collaborative groups and it puts moderate time pressure on individuals.
Cooperative goal structure In order to ensure comparable levels of motivation among participants, the following conditions were introduced in both experimental conditions: (a) physical co-presence of two other group members, (b) cooperative structure of monetary reward for correct solutions per task trial, 1 (c) feedback of individual and group performance to all group members after each trial and (d) the expectation of future collaboration between members. Such conditions are described in the literature to reduce motivation loss in groups (e.g. Shepperd, 1993) . Several paper and pencil tests measuring motivational tendencies before and after the training phase were administered. No motivational differences were found between the experimental groups that might have a confounding influence on the major hypotheses to be tested here (cf. Brodbeck & Greitemeyer, in press).
Performance measures As noted in the subjects' and the groups' protocol sheets, correct, plausible and non-plausible hypotheses were assessed for all 10 task steps per task (interim hypotheses) and for the final solution per task trial, for each person during individual and collective rule induction, and for each group during collective rule induction. A correct hypothesis exactly matches the arbitrarily selected rule. A plausible hypothesis means that the assumed rule matches the available evidence (the cards played) but not the correct rule. A non-plausible hypothesis means that the available evidence does not match the rule proposed by the subject.
The time required from the beginning of the group task to the formulation of the final hypothesis, and the number of interim group hypotheses generated during task performance were measured and a collective efficiency score was calculated (i.e. time required per collective task step). (2) groups with at least one group member who reported a correct final hypothesis are shown (i.e. nominal group potential). For collective posttest tasks, the proportion of collaborative groups with at least one group member who reported a correct final individual hypothesis (i.e. collective group potential) and the proportion of groups that reported a correct final group hypothesis (i.e. group performance) is shown. Additionally, for the mixed individual and group training condition, proportions of collective potential and group performance are presented in all four training tasks that were performed collectively.
Results
Hypothesis 1, stating that group performance increases as a function of experience, was tested first. At the collective posttest, the proportion of mixed training groups that reported a correct final group decision (82%) was higher than the respective proportion of individual training groups (59%) ( 2 (1, N ϭ 44) ϭ 2.73, p Ͻ .10). Within the mixed training condition, the increase in group performance from the first to the fifth collective task trial was tested with McNemar repeated measurement analysis (i.e. a test for dependent samples with dichotomous variables). A significant increase from 32 percent of the inexperienced groups reporting correct final hypotheses to 82 percent of the experienced groups was shown (exact twotailed p ϭ .0034, N ϭ 22). Results support hypothesis 1 suggesting that group performance increases as a function of experience in collective rule induction under time pressure.
Hypothesis 2, predicting individual learning improvements that extend to the nominal group potential was tested next. In the mixed training condition, McNemar repeated measurement analysis from nominal pretest to nominal posttest was conducted. The increase in nominal group potential from a proportion of 59 percent to 91 percent was significant (exact two-tailed p ϭ .0391, N ϭ 22). In order to test for G-I transfer effects that extend to the nominal group potential, mixed training and individual training conditions were compared with chi-squarecross classification analysis for truth detection in the nominal posttest. No significant difference in nominal group potential was found ( 2 (1, N ϭ 44) ϭ 0.00, p ϭ 1.00). Results support the prediction that mixed training is associated with individual learning improvements that extend to the nominal group potential, with no further individual benefits resulting from G-I transfer. Hypothesis 3a, stating that process loss is reduced as a result of group experience, was tested next. Based on the nominal and collective posttest results, the relative frequency of groups with a collective potential (at task trial 10) that is below their prior nominal potential (at task trial 9) was computed. The proportions of groups found were submitted to a chi-squarecross classification analysis comparing the mixed training with the individual training condition. The expected difference was shown to be significant at a one-tailed alpha level of .05 ( 2 (1, N ϭ 44) ϭ 3.03, p ϭ .08). After individual training, 36 percent of the groups show process loss (i.e. a collective potential that is below their prior nominal potential) as compared to only 14 percent of the mixed training groups. Results support the prediction that process loss is reduced as a result of group experience.
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For the mixed training condition, the progress curves of the nominal potential (at task trials 1, 3, 5, 7, 9) and the collective potential (at task trials 2, 4, 6, 8, 10) are directly compared to each other in Figure 1 . It can be seen that the nominal group potential (interrupted line) increases more strongly than the collective group potential and reaches a maximum level of about .90 that is maintained across subsequent task trials. The collective potential increases slowly and linearly until in the last two instances it is indistinguishable from the nominal group potential. The altogether five difference scores (termed ⌬P) between the nominal potential (at task trials 1, 3, 5, 7, 9) and the collective potential (at task trials 2, 4, 6, 8, 10) represent the progress curve of process loss (see Figure 2 , thin line). The obviously inverted Ushaped curvilinear relationship between group task experience and process loss was subjected to a trend analysis according to the regression model. A quadratic regression function with Y 1 ϭ 27.76 ⌬P Ϫ 5.64 ⌬P 2 (see Figure 2 , bold line) describes the data best (R 2 ϭ .91, p Ͻ .05, N ϭ 5). These findings suggest a somewhat paradoxical effect, namely, that during the first few task trials, process loss increases and on later occasions process loss decreases. When perceived as a function of two distinct progress curves (the nominal and the collective group potential) the paradox effect is explained by the different slope of the two progress curves (see Figure 1) . However, in the present experiment it is likely that the particular shape of changes in the nominal potential is due to a ceiling effect. As can be seen in Figure 1 , the nominal group potential comes close to the maximum possible level of truth detection per group (1.00). Thus, in Experiment 2 more difficult tasks were used in order to reduce the likelihood of a ceiling effect for the nominal group potential. Hypothesis 3b was tested next. Collective efficiency, operationalized as the time taken per task step during collective task performance, was measured as an indicator of collective efficiency (i.e. smooth coordination, decision making and conflict resolution). In the posttest, collective efficiency of mixed training and individual training groups was compared with one-way ANOVA. Individual training groups required significantly more time per task step (M ϭ 1.07 min, SD ϭ 0.21) than mixed training groups (M ϭ 0.87 min, SD ϭ 0.20) (F(1, 43) ϭ 10.43, p Ͻ .01). It seems that group experienced participants have learned to collaborate more smoothly than have individual training participants. In hypothesis 3b, it was assumed that the mixed training benefit in collective truth detection (i.e. solution quality) is a function of improved collective efficiency. This assumption was tested by conducting mediator analysis according to Baron and Kenny (1986) . Logistic regression was used for the mediator test because the dependent variable is dichotomous. In the collective posttest, the correctness of final group hypothesis was regressed on the experimental condition, once without controlling for collective efficiency (⌬ 2 ϭ 2.78, p Ͻ .10, R ϭ .11, N ϭ 44) and once with controlling for collective efficiency (⌬ 2 ϭ 0.51, p Ͼ .45, R ϭ .00, N ϭ 44). Without controlling for collective efficiency, mixed training is positively associated with proportion of correct final hypotheses. When collective efficiency is statistically controlled, mixed training is unrelated to proportion of correct final hypotheses. Thus, it seems that higher collective efficiency mediates the mixed training groups' superiority over individual training groups in truth detection.
Finally, we addressed the question whether process gain is evident as a result of individual learning to collaborate. This was inferred when, as a result of group experience, the groups' nominal potential at task trial 9 is surpassed by the collective group potential at task 10. We computed the relative frequency of groups with a collective potential for truth detection at task trial 10 that was above their nominal potential at task trial 9. Nine percent of the mixed training groups showed process gain; however, this proportion was offset by 14 percent of the mixed training groups that showed process loss. Thus, there is no evidence for net process gain. In the individual training condition, 9 percent of the groups showed process gain and 36 percent process loss. Thus, substantial net process loss is evident. While there is no significant difference between individual and mixed training groups in process gain ( 2 (1, N ϭ 44) ϭ .00, ns), the difference in process loss was significant at an alpha level of .05 (see above).
Experiment 2
Experiment 2 serves the purpose of replicating the results from Experiment 1 under somewhat different conditions. For economical reasons, altogether only eight task trials were investigated. This enables introducing the same amount of group experience as in Experiment 1 (four group task trials). However, the nominal group potential was measured only once during the training phase. This reduces the opportunity for mixed training participants to practice rule induction individually. Furthermore, tasks of higher difficulty were introduced. The rationale for using more difficult tasks was to replicate the finding of an inverted U-shaped curvilinear progress curve for process loss that is unaffected by a ceiling effect in the nominal group potential.
In both experiments, participants in the individual training condition can fully concentrate on improving their individual resources for solving the tasks more effectively and efficiently, and mixed training participants can improve their resources for solving the individual and the collective task requirements more effectively and efficiently. In Experiment 2, the amount of individual practice in the mixed training is reduced but not the amount of group collaborative practice. In Experiment 1, mixed training participants performed four out of eight tasks (50%) in a nominal group setting before posttest performance was measured. In
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Experiment 2, only two out of six tasks (33%) are performed in nominal group settings. Consequently, mixed training participants have less opportunity to adapt their individual resources to the individual task context. If individual practice is critical to perform the task more effectively in subsequent nominal group settings, group training should result in a lower level of nominal group potential at the posttest than individual training.
For solving the more difficult tasks in Experiment 2, five more steps were allowed than in Experiment 1 (15 instead of 10). The time restriction of 10 minutes remained the same as in Experiment 1. Under these conditions, individual resources for performing smooth coordination, decision making and conflict resolution are even more critical for efficient collective rule induction because more task steps need to be processed collaboratively than in Experiment 1.
The dissimilar conditions between Experiments 1 and 2 (task difficulty, amount of task steps, amount of individual practice during mixed training) should not affect the general applicability of the dynamic model because in both experiments rule induction tasks are repeatedly performed under time pressure. Thus, the same three assumptions as before were tested in the present experiment: (1) group performance improves with group experience, (2) improvements in individual performance extend to the nominal group potential, (3a) process loss is reduced as a function of group experience (3b) which is mediated via individual learning to collaborate (i.e. collective efficiency).
Method
Subjects and design Participants were 174 students from German universities and technical colleges in Munich who received 30 German marks (about US$16) for their participation. The experimental design was a two factorial (individual training vs. mixed training) two level posttest (individual vs. group performance) design with 22 (group level) replications in the individual training condition and 36 (group level) replications in the mixed training condition.
Procedure and instructions All procedures, instructions, time restriction, motivational conditions and performance variables were exactly the same as in Experiment 1. The design of Experiment 2 is described in Table 2 in the results section. The same phases as in Experiment 1 were distinguished: (a) nominal group pretest, (b) training phase and (c) nominal and collective posttest. Experiment 2 is different from Experiment 1 basically in two respects. First, after the individual pretest (task trial 1) random series of five rule induction tasks were performed by sets of three participants assigned to either individual training, performing all tasks in a nominal group setting, or to mixed training performing task trials 2 and 3 and task trials 5 and 6 collectively and task trial 4 individually. Second, the random set of rule induction tasks was more difficult to solve (range of task solution rate: 19% to 51%) as compared to set of tasks used in the previous experiment (range of task solution rate: 32% to 71%). There were eight different rules:
The most difficult rule was o-o-C; only 19 percent of all subjects solved that rule correctly. The easiest rule was r-b-r-r; 51 percent of all subjects solved that rule correctly. Table  2 in the same way as in the previous experiment.
Results
Results of Experiment 2 are presented in
Hypothesis 1 predicting improvements in group performance to be a function of experience was tested by comparing group performance in the posttest between individual training groups and mixed training groups. Sixty percent of mixed training groups reported a correct final group decision as compared to only 27 percent of the individual training groups. The difference is significant ( 2 (1, N ϭ 57) ϭ 5.80, p Ͻ .05). For the mixed training condition, repeated measurement analysis from first to fifth collective task trial was conducted with the McNemar test, resulting in a significant increase of group performance from a proportion of 17 percent for inexperienced groups to 60 percent for experienced groups (exact two-
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tailed p ϭ .0003, N ϭ 36). The results support the assumption that group performance increases with experience in collective rule induction under time pressure. Hypothesis 2 predicts individual task performance learning to extend to the nominal group potential. It was tested in the mixed training condition with McNemar repeated measurement analysis. An increase from a proportion of 42 percent correct final hypotheses in the nominal pretest to a proportion of 66 percent in the nominal posttest was evident, which is significant at a one-tailed alpha level of .05 (exact two-tailed p ϭ .0636, N ϭ 36). Furthermore, a significant difference was found when comparing the nominal group potential after mixed training (66%) and after individual training (91%) ( 2 (1, N ϭ 58) ϭ 4.38, p Ͻ .05). Taken together, results support the assumption that individual learning extends to the nominal group potential in the mixed training condition; however, these individual level learning benefits are less pronounced than in the individual training condition.
Hypothesis 3a predicting group experience to reduce process loss was tested by comparing the relative frequencies of groups that show a collective potential (at task trial 8) that is below their nominal potential (at task trial 7). The proportions of groups found were submitted to a chi-square-cross classification analysis comparing the mixed training with the individual training condition. The expected difference was shown to be significant ( 2 (1, N ϭ 56) ϭ 8.54, p Ͻ .01). After individual training 62 percent and after mixed training only 23 percent of the groups showed process loss. This finding supports the prediction that process loss is reduced as a result of group experience.
For the mixed training condition, the progress curves of the nominal potential (at task trials 1, 4, 7) and the collective potential (at task trials 2, 3, 5, 6, 8) are described in Figure 3 . This time, however, only three values for the nominal potential were available (at task trials 1, 4, 7). For illustrating the progress curve of the nominal potential in a similar way as in Experiment 1, data from task trials 4 and 7 were used twice (which constitutes a conservative estimate of the progress curve).
As in Experiment 1, it can be seen that the nominal group potential (interrupted line) increases more strongly than the collective group potential and reaches a maximum level at about .70 that is maintained across subsequent task trials. The collective potential increases slowly during the first instances; however, this time, it does not reach the level of the nominal group potential until the last instance. Again, five difference scores (termed ⌬P) between the collective potential (at task trials 2, 3, 5, 6, 8) and the nominal potential were calculated. The nominal potential at task trial 4 was used for calculating the difference to the collective potential at task trials 3 and 5, and the nominal potential at task trial 7 was used for calculating the difference to the collective potential at task trials 6 and 8 (see Figure 4 , thin line). The resulting curvilinear progress curve of process loss that was once more an inverted Ushape was subjected to a trend analysis according to the regression model. A quadratic regression function with Y 2 ϭ 26.43 ⌬P Ϫ 5.07 ⌬P 2 (see Figure 4 , bold line), which is closely similar to the one reported for Experiment 1, represents the data to a high degree (R 2 ϭ .96, p Ͻ .01, N ϭ 5). Thus, again a paradoxical effect was found for the development of process loss; during the first few task trials, process loss increases and on later occasions process loss decreases. In the present experiment, there was no ceiling effect evident for the nominal potential in the mixed training condition. As can be seen in Figure 3 , the nominal group potential, not exceeding a level of .70, doesn't come close to the maximum possible level of truth detection per group (1.00).
Hypothesis 3b was tested next. Comparison of collective efficiency scores by one-way ANOVA showed that mixed training groups require significantly less time per task step (M ϭ 0.76 min, SD ϭ 0.18) than individual training groups (M ϭ 1.01 min, SD ϭ 0.38) (F(1, 55) ϭ 10.76, p Ͻ .01). It was also tested whether superior truth detection of mixed training groups is a function of their members' higher collective efficiency. Correctness of final group decisions was regressed on experimental condition (again by logistic regression) without controlling for collective efficiency (⌬ 2 ϭ 5.97, p Ͻ .05, R ϭ .21, N ϭ 56), and with controlling for collective efficiency (⌬ 2 ϭ 1.30, p Ͼ .25, R ϭ .00, N ϭ 56). The reduction in effect size supports the assumption that the beneficial effect of group experience on collective truth detection is mediated by collective efficiency.
Finally, the question of whether individual learning to collaborate results in process gain was investigated. Once more, in the posttest phase, the relative frequency of groups that show a collective potential to solve the task correctly that is higher than their nominal poten- Figure 4 . Progress curve of process loss (i.e. the difference between neighboring nominal and collective group potentials (⌬P), thin line) as a function of group experience, for n ϭ 36 groups in the mixed training condition (Experiment 2; for better comparison the nominal group potential at task trials 4 and 7 were used twice, see Figure 3 ). 
General discussion
Support for the dynamic model
The evidence from both experiments supports all three hypotheses derived from the dynamic model of group performance. First, group performance increased as a function of group experience. Thus, the fundamental assumption of the group learning approach applies to collective rule induction performed under challenging time restrictions. This extends previous studies of group learning in rule induction in which task completion time was not experimentally controlled (e.g. Hollingshead, 1998) . Second, experience in task performance increased the nominal group potential in both experiments; however, no evidence of G-I transfer for truth detection was found. The latter finding is in accord with the findings reported by Hollingshead (1998) . In Experiment 1, the progress of nominal group potential remained the same in the individual training and the mixed individual and group training conditions, however, in Experiment 2, the predominantly group training condition resulted in a lower level of nominal group potential than the individual training condition. It seems that in Experiment 2, the mixed training participants did not have enough opportunity to improve their resources for effective individual task performance. Our conclusion is that for collective rule induction, growth in group performance is attributable, at least in part, to more effective individual task performance learning that extends to the nominal group potential. Third, under the same time restrictions throughout all task trials, purely individual training groups suffered substantial process loss when performing collectively in the posttest. In the mixed training (Experiment 1) and the predominant group training condition (Experiment 2), process loss was substantially reduced or even eliminated. Furthermore, the group trained groups' superiority in truth detection was mediated by higher collective efficiency, indicating that group experienced individuals learned to collaborate more smoothly which enabled them to transform more of their individual (nominal) resources into correct final hypotheses during group collaborative performance. The findings of reduced process loss as a consequence of group experience are difficult to explain by motivational causes. In both studies, experimental conditions were matched for a variety of factors that are known to result in motivation loss: presence of others (e.g. evaluation apprehension, social inhibition), cooperative reward structure (e.g. social dilemma of private vs. public goods, cf. Kerr, 1983; Shepperd, 1993) , feedback of individual and group performance levels (e.g. evaluation apprehension, information about performance of others, cf. Paulus & Dzindolet, 1993) and the anticipation of future collaboration on tasks (common fate). The paper and pencil measures taken in both experiments revealed no motivational differences between experimental conditions that might confound the tested hypotheses.
Overall, it seems that over a repeated performance of group collaborative tasks, the individuals' skills critical to reducing coordination loss (e.g. smooth coordination of individual contributions, rapid decision making, conflict resolution) improve in a way that is profitable Brodbeck & Greitemeyer a dynamic model of group performance for group performance in the long run. This finding and the counterintuitive finding of an inverted U-shaped progress curve for the development of process loss should raise the group researcher's interest to investigate issues of time, efficiency and group learning across a considerable number of task trials when employing combination of contributions models.
No evidence was found for a link between group experience and process gain for truth detection. Neither was a G-I transfer that extends to the nominal group potential detected, nor was the individuals learning to collaborate associated with levels of group collective potential or actual performance that indicate net process gains.
Limitations and generalizations
The performance criterion in the present study was limited to truth detection. Results for rejection of non-plausible hypotheses (error correction) and behavioral strategies associated with it are reported elsewhere (Brodbeck & Greitemeyer, in press ). Furthermore, rule induction was performed under time restrictions. A major part of the reduction in process loss attributable to group experience seems to be due to increased collective efficiency. Thus, generalizations of the findings reported here to collective induction performed without time limit may not be valid. However, in our view, moderate time pressure in rule induction is a situational condition that, in some cases, is more realistic than no time limit. Imagine unforeseen meetings of medical diagnostic teams in which collective induction is applied. Their members often need to perform under great time pressure due to their other job requirements. This demands the capability of the group members to convert their individual potential into maximum performance within the group meeting 'just in time'. Our results suggest that group training is a good preparation for such extra-task requirements in addition to individual training.
One difficulty became apparent when individual task performance learning was operationalized as a component of group learning.
The more individual practice is allowed for during the mixed training phase the more can individual task learning also be attributed to practicing individual task performance rather than to experiences undergone during collective task performance. Thus, strictly speaking, individual task learning was not unequivocally established as one source of group learning. However, when considering an experimental design that completely excludes individual task performance from the group training phase, one should be aware of three drawbacks: first, for identifying a progress curve of process loss a within-group assessment of nominal and collective group potentials is necessary; second, recent findings from Staudinger and Baltes (1996) who investigated wisdom related tasks, suggest that individual elaboration of experiences undergone during social interactive episodes is an important precondition for G-I transfer to occur; and third, the natural acting group often more resembles a mixed individual and group collaborative setting than a purely group collaborative setting (e.g. research teams, product development teams, top management teams).
Even though process loss was substantially reduced in our experiments and the group members' capacity to learn was more reasonably acknowledged than in traditional small group research, no process gain for truth detection was evident. This result seems to strengthen the position of group deficit theories. However, evidence for G-I transfer (correction of one's own errors) and individual learning to collaborate (correction of each other's errors) in collective task contexts was secured upon conducting a more in depth analysis of behavioral strategies in rule induction (Brodbeck & Greitemeyer, in press) . Whether process gain is manifest or not also seems to depend on the task performance criteria being considered.
In the introductory section we argued that the elimination of process loss is one important strategy for identifying mechanisms that result in process gain. The findings of the present study showed that process loss in truth detection can be eliminated by allowing individual
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Differentiating between individual and group level learning Davis and Harless (1996) investigated group level learning with an iterated monopoly-pricing problem with 20 choice periods and two levels of difficulty. For the difficult pricing problem, they found that groups generate higher profits in later periods and respond better to feedback than individuals. In no task period were groups significantly worse than their best members. The authors conjecture that superior learning by whole groups is a result of collective error-checking. From the view of our dynamic model, Davis and Harless' study establishes a progress curve of the nominal group potential by using a control condition with nominal groups. However, in this way, effects of G-I transfer and individual learning to collaborate are not controlled for. This leaves the possibility open that the best members in their face-to-face groups improved to a similar degree as the best members in the nominal control groups, but that they additionally profited from the other group members' improved error checking behavior, thereby raising the entire group's potential. This explanation somewhat contradicts the explanation given by Davis and Harless (1996) . They prefer interpreting their results in terms of a group level learning effect and argue that groups identify their best member and let him/her dominate the final decision.
Conclusion
The group has gained more and more attention as an information processing and learning unit (e.g. Argote, 1993; Argote & McGrath, 1993; Hinsz et al., 1997) . However, the relationships between group interaction, group member learning and growth in individual and group performance have not been illuminated to a sufficient extent. In this study, a dynamic model of group performance was developed. By drawing on the fundamental assumptions of the combination of contributions approach and the group learning approach several principal mechanisms by which individual learning and group learning interact were suggested. Our research extends previous studies on group learning in three ways. First, it demonstrated that group learning is a function of various sources of learning, for example, improvements in individual resources for performing the task individually and individual learning to collaborate more smoothly during collective performance. Second, it demonstrated that process loss can be reduced or even eliminated when a considerable amount of task trials (n ϭ 5) is performed in a group collaborative context. Third, by applying the model's propositions to experimental studies from the literature, alternative explanations for the group (level) learning effects shown were generated and some new theoretical questions were raised.
Note
1. In addition to the financial reward given for participation in the experiment, each individual was paid a bonus of up to 15 German marks (about US$8) based on nominal or collective group performance in all 10 task trials. For each of the 10 task trials, a maximum of 15 points could be achieved; 5 points for every individual's correct hypothesis in the nominal group setting and 15 points for a correct group hypothesis in the collaborative group setting (i.e. a maximum of 150 points). For every 10 points 1 German mark was given to the group to be equally shared among group members.
